History is Back

8/8/2008 seems to be a special day, not only because it's the day that China opened the Olympic Games with its extravagant opening ceremony, but also it's the day that Russia invaded Georgia.

That night I was sitting in the news room, watching live broadcast of Zhang Yimou's show. At the beginning, the top story of major international news media like CNN, BBC, or Al Jazeera was about the Beijing Olympic Games, then, breaking news came in that Russian tanks moved into the territory of Georgia. My immediate response was, 'Woah, Russia is stealing the show'. The situation was quite murky at the first. Later, when the story was unfolded and more details came out, some questions appeared.

The first one is the timing. Is it a coincidence, or a conspiracy of a bunch of neo-cons? I'm actually not really into such a guess work, but I'm sure Saakashvili's reckless action must have obtained nod of White House in advance. Strangely, so far, there is no report to explore this aspect. Although the rumor of conspiracy is spreading, the truth nevertheless would hide somewhere. Perhaps I have to wait until someday in the future, the confidential files about the communication between Washington and Tbilisi are accessible to the public.

Leaving this unknown truth behind, some pundits have started to treat the Beijing Olympic Games and Russia-Georgian conflicts as two historical events, and capped them into a catchy phrase 8/8. Since today marks the seventh anniversary of 9/11, it is indeed the day to ponder a bit what has happened since then, what it is now, and what will happen in the future.

Here comes Timothy Garton Ash's sweeping view that has been published transatlantically in the Guardian and the L.A. Times, which is noteworthy. It's far better than Kagan's dichotomy thinking, but alas, I still have some doubts. Ash has made it clear that neo-cons doctrine of the 'war on terror' is not the only thread that defines the mesh of global politics. Judging from the current atmosphere of the general election campaign in the US, one may find how eerily this phrase has been outdated in both candidates' rhetoric that Obama and McCain are all emphasizing the word 'change' now.

One of the decisive factors in moving towards such a direction is the rise of the rest, that the economic slice of China, India, Russia, and Brazil in the global volume has been largely increased, therefore, their political weight in the world stage. The new rhetoric is that since China and Russia are both autocratic countries, their increasing economic power will disturb or even threaten the current world order if they don't join the democratic world.

Ash is quite concerned about the economic prospect of these new comers, but I'm a bit surprised that he quotes Goldman Sachs' prediction about BRIC's economic performance in 2040 to support his argument.

‘Analysts at Goldman Sachs predict that by 2040, China, India, Russia, Brazil and Mexico will have a larger combined economic output than today's G7. The date matters less than the trend. Even today, the shifts in economic power are translating into political and military power faster than many anticipated.’

The logic error lies in using the unknown as a matter of fact to portray a quasi-realistic scenario. Take China for example, whether it can sustain the current development rate as per Goldman Sachs' prediction has already been questioned by a lot of people. The high speed development of China in the last 30 years doesn't guarantee that it can do so in the next 30 years. China's problems, to name but a few, such as the shortage of energy supply, water supply, and natural resources; the binary system of the rural and the urban which have overtaxed peasants without granting them the same welfare treatment as city residents do; the alarming gap between the rich and the poor, lack of clear picture for institutional reforms; comparatively low productivity; infantile knowledge-based economy; all these are daunting tasks to tackle, which would significantly affect its economic growth in the global context.

Nevertheless, it's still quite inspiring to see that 'we of the FLIO (friends of liberal international order) must now confront the prospect of a new world disorder. Or rather old-new, for disorder rather than order is the more natural condition of international society', but I'm not so sure whether this 'we' refer to the people across the world who dedicate to universal values, or it just refer to the western nations, because later on Ash argues that 'Russia and China are not just great powers challenging the west. They also represent alternative versions of authoritarian capitalism, or capitalist authoritarianism.'

It seems to me that Ash's 'we' is more about the identification with the nation than the universal liberal values. I must say such a way of thinking, which is now prevailing in both the west and the east, is the most worrisome sign, and if this tide is not turned around, the so-called democracy vs. autocracy confrontation will probably be self-reflexively fulfilled.

Ash seems quite clear about such a negative prospect as he says that 'we should not kid ourselves that we can have only liberal democracies as partners', but later on when he says 'our values may pull us that way, but our interests will necessarily push us to relationships and even partnerships with currently illiberal states as well', he again identifies himself with interests (What interests? No elaboration. From the context, I judge they are the national interests or western interests.), even though he acknowledges that 'the future of freedom now depends on the possibility of new versions of modernity evolving - whether in India, China or the Muslim world, which are distinctly non-western yet also recognizably liberal, in the core sense of cherishing individual freedom'.

The problem is, juxtaposing the advocacy of universal values such as liberty and human rights with the national interests will not enlighten those being repressed or oppressed; it will only heighten the awareness of national identity, and creating the mental barricade between 'we' and 'you'. Sadly, advocating universal values is already repressed in China while some public intellectuals are struggling, but sometimes I'm even more grieved to see that in another side of world, such idea of humanity is slowly being marred by advocating national interests in economic term while global anti-poverty and development issues have been ignored.

Where is the legacy of those prominent public intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt and Edward Said, that seeking the glory and manifestation of true humanity – unconditional ethical engagement, without overly identifying with any national interests is the central of one's endeavor?

History is back, not in terms of national interests, but in terms of defending the true humanity which transcends nationalism. This 'we' should never be nations. We should always be people, no matter what color they are, no matter where they are from.